

ZEUS HYPISISTOS MEGISTOS: AN ARGUMENT FOR ENCLITIC του IN AESCHYLUS, *AGAMEMNON* 182¹

Maurice Pope in his article entitled 'Merciful Heavens?' in *JHS* 94 (1974), 100–13, argues that the reading of M in *Ag.* 182–3

δαιμόνων δὲ ποῦ χάρις βιαίως | σέλημα σεμνὸν ἡμένων;

should be preserved. The alternative contenders, which have received more support from scholars, are the versions of (1) F, Triclinius:

δαιμόνων δὲ που χάρις βίαιως | σέλημα σεμνὸν ἡμένων,

and (2) Turnebus:

δαιμόνων δὲ που χάρις βίαιος | σέλημα σεμνὸν ἡμένων.

Pope argues against these two alternatives in turn. I offer the following evaluation and criticism, together with my own view of the general sense of the passage.

1. Pope's Argument against Triclinius

In pages 101–3 of his article Pope lists the numbers of occurrences of interrogative ποῦ and enclitic που in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and mentions occurrences in other authors. He shows that, although there is a dead heat between the numbers of instances of the two words in Aeschylus, nevertheless enclitic που is very rarely indeed, and perhaps never, found in sentences which do not have a main verb (or, failing that, at least subject and predicate). There are, however, occurrences of interrogative ποῦ in sentences which lack a main verb and have no predicate either.² It must surely be rare to find statement sentences which do not contain at least subject and predicate at the best of times, let alone when που happens to occur in the sentence. There are strong reasons, then, for rejecting the version of F and Triclinius, quite apart from the occurrence of που in the sentence. One can defend by saying that either ἦλθε is understood from the preceding sentence, or else γίγνεται is vaguely understood: 'The favour of the gods comes to men (comes about) perforce.' But it is not very plausible. I am inclined to agree with Pope on this point, if not for quite the same reason.

2. Pope's Arguments against Turnebus

2.1. The first set of arguments which Pope produces against Turnebus are probability arguments. He makes out a case that the odds against omicron being changed to omega in line 182 of the *Agamemnon* are very long. His argument is, basically, as follows.

Although after Roman times omega and omicron sounded alike, change of accent (as from βίαιος to βιαίως) made a difference in the sound. Therefore we should expect to find a significant difference between the number of instances where change from omicron to omega involved a change of accent and where it

¹ I should like to express my gratitude to Mrs. P.E. Easterling and to Professor David Packard for some help on detailed points; but the responsibility for everything said in

this article is mine, and mine alone.

² Possibly in these cases ποῦ itself is a kind of predicate.

did not. He counts numbers of instances of this in the *Prometheus* and in the *Agamemnon*, and he shows that, where this change of vowel appears to have occurred in these plays, it has happened far more commonly without than with change of accent. In fact, the number of instances in which it has occurred with change of accent is very small. Considering now that a correct omega (*sic*: does he not mean omicron?) was to be expected on average twice in every three lines of a Greek play, then the odds against a change of omicron to omega in Ag. 182 (involving a change of accent) are very long; against this occurring in a number of manuscripts independently they are even longer.

The argument is unsatisfactory on several counts. First, three points to do with manuscript tradition:

(1) The Attic alphabet, which was presumably in use when Aeschylus's text was first copied, had no omega, so that *o* and *ω* were indistinguishable. This alphabet may have continued till near the end of the fifth century B.C.

(2) If scribes at some time after the end of the fifth century transcribed the text into the Ionic alphabet, they may have had an oral tradition to help them to decide between *o* and *ω*, but before Alexandrian times there was no written accentuation.

(3) In Alexandrian times, when accents were applied, it is quite unsafe to rely upon the correctness of an oral tradition.

Thus errors in *o/ω* go back, quite possibly, to the earliest times, and we can conclude (1) that the *authority* of M is less assured than it may seem, and (2) that it may be wrong to talk of the error occurring *independently* in several manuscripts.

Next, we might offer to Pope's bookie some helpful comments on the manner in which he should assess his odds. In what follows, change of accent is taken to imply change of position of accent or else change in the number of accents in a word.

(a) Pope shows, by tables given on p. 104 of his article, that omega for omicron occurs in far fewer cases when change of accent is involved than otherwise. Before he can draw from this the conclusion which he wants to draw, namely that omega for omicron is far (ten times) less likely to occur when change of accent is involved than otherwise, he must show that the proportion of cases of actual corruption of omicron to omega, in which change of accent has occurred, is significantly smaller than the proportion of over-all occurrences of omicron in which a change to omega would involve a change of accent. In the first 71 lines of *Agamemnon*, I found 135 omicrons (I did not include occurrences of omicron in diphthongs); in 22 of these 135 cases a change to omega would have caused a change of accent. This gave a rough estimate of the over-all proportion as 0.163 (= 22/135). Now this figure is not very much larger than the corresponding proportions obtained from Pope's figures for cases where omicron has in fact been changed to omega. I give these proportions for *P.V.* only, since the figures for *Agamemnon* are so small that it makes a material difference whether we decide to regard Ag. 182 as corrupt or not.

	M	16 other MSS.
First Hand	0.133	0.101
After correction	0.250	0.120

These figures represent the ratios X/t , the data being taken from Pope's table on p. 104 of his article, where t = total number of cases of corruption

of σ to ω , X = number of cases of corruption of σ to ω in which change of accent is involved. Proper statistical tests are not possible, because the conditions for them do not hold, for reasons given in the next section. The figure of 0.250 for M after correction is of no importance because it is based on very small numbers of occurrences. The other proportions derived from Pope's data and based on cases of actual corruption are somewhat smaller than the over-all estimate of 0.163, but not very much smaller. On this evidence, it is not possible to be sure that change of accent makes *any* difference to the probability of omicron being corrupted to omega, let alone decreases it tenfold. Thus Pope has seriously overestimated the extent to which the change of accent in $\beta\acute{\iota}\alpha\omega\varsigma/\beta\iota\alpha\omega\varsigma$ affects the probability of the corruption having occurred in *Ag.* 182.

The foregoing is only a rough guide to the situation, sufficient perhaps to make the general point. As statistical tests are not possible, it did not seem worth while to take a large count from the *Agamemnon*. The whole matter is bedevilled, in any case, by uncertainties in the diagnosis of corruption, which makes Pope's figures uncertain from the start, as he himself admits.

- (b) Suppose now that E is a rare event which occurs with *constant* probability p (p small) in each one of a set of N *independent* trials. Suppose we find that, in an actual set of N trials, the event E occurs n times. Then according to classical probability theory we estimate the value of p to be n/N ; and this is our estimate of the probability that E will occur in an $(N + 1)$ th trial. If we use Bayesian probability theory, the estimate is $(n + a)/(N + b)$, where a and b are constants having to do with any prior beliefs we may have about p ; but for large enough N , a and b become negligible and the estimate reduces to that of classical probability theory.

If Pope's bookie is to set up a proper method of estimating the odds in this case ('odds against' means ratio of probability that E does not occur to probability that it does occur, that is, $(1 - p)/p$), then he must define clearly his n , his N , and his E . He must also show that p remains constant over all trials and that the trials are 'independent'; independence means that the probability of E occurring in any particular trial is independent of what happens in any other trial. If this is not so, then probabilities cannot be estimated in this way, and furthermore the tests referred to in the preceding section cannot be applied.

He defines n , it seems, as the number of cases in which omicron is changed to omega with change of accent. He does not define N at all, but vaguely told his bookie that 'a correct omega was to be expected on average twice in every three lines of a Greek play'. What has the occurrence of correct omega to do with it? Surely N should be the number of occurrences of correct omicron in which a change to omega would cause a change of accent (including cases where omicron *ought* to have occurred, but was corrupted; excluding the omicron of the supposed $\beta\acute{\iota}\alpha\omega\varsigma$, which is treated as the $(N + 1)$ th trial). The event E should be the event that omicron is changed to omega with change of accent.

But even then, are we on safe ground? Emphatically, no. For it is very hard to assume that p is constant over all the trials. It is, for example, *a priori* reasonable to suppose (and I think this is borne out by most people's experience, though I know of no definite statistical investigation of the

matter) that there is far higher probability of omicron being corrupted to omega in a case where the new text still makes a grammatically correct word than when it doesn't; there is even higher probability of omicron going to omega where the new text is not only grammatically correct but also makes something like sense in the context. In particular, in Ag. 182 the text of M makes something like sense, especially if context is ignored, and an error in omega was much more likely to escape the notice of both the scribe and the corrector than such errors elsewhere. I do not know of any investigation yet made to see whether the errors of scribes are randomly distributed over whole plays or whether they occur in clusters; the latter state of affairs might indicate lack of independence. We are not sure that we have independent trials.

I do not mean to suggest that we should pay no attention at all to the rarity of certain kinds of corruption in texts. All I say is, first, that it is practically impossible to quantify these probabilities, and second, that arguments of this kind should be used with extreme circumspection and regard for the individual features of the individual case. Certainly I feel very doubtful about the prospects of Pope's bookie making much money out of this particular venture.

2.2. It remains, then, to examine the three arguments which Pope adduces against Turnebus on p. 105 of his article. These arguments are:

- (a) The last three words of the sentence (σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμένων) are 'grammatically unnecessary and semantically . . . pointless'.

False: if Turnebus's text is accepted, the three words stress the role of the gods as world governors, and have therefore, semantically, considerable point. I do not see the purpose of Pope's 'grammatically unnecessary'; we could eliminate an awful lot of words from an awful lot of sentences on this basis.

- (b) χάρις βίαιος is an 'outrageous paradox'.

False: there is nothing at all unreasonable in talking of a favour which is *forced* upon men by the gods, and the paradox, far from being outrageous, has the same telling literary effect as that related literary figure, the oxymoron. Compare *P. V.* 545 ἄχαρις χάρις for the same figure (paradox) used with the same word.

- (c) δαίμονες refers not just to Zeus and his fellow-Olympians, but is used as a catch-all for all gods and spirits.

Not necessarily true at all; the δαίμονες here are specified by the last three words of the sentence (σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμένων) to be the gods who at this moment of time control the world.

Thus every one of these three arguments breaks down.

3. Pope's own interpretation

Pope takes ποῦ interrogative (as in M), and translates (or interprets) the word χάρις to mean 'comfort'; 'Where is there any comfort . . .', that is, 'There can be no comfort'. I cannot clearly determine from his text just how he constructs δαιμόνων. Genitive absolute, or dependent on χάρις? One can guess at Pope's view of this by referring to his interpretative outline on p. 110: 'There can be no comfort in living under such a violent system of government.' If the Bacchylides parallel is anything to go by, he should be taking δαιμόνων to be dependent on

χάρις. Again, in his outline he takes βιαίως to mean 'violently'; yet on p. 105 he insists that the word means not 'violently', but 'unnaturally' or 'by force'. So we must take our pick.

Pope quotes a literary parallel for the use of interrogative ποῦ from Bacchylides (about Croesus): [πο]ῦ θεῶν ἐστὶν χάρις; [πο]ῦ δὲ Λατοῖδας ἀναξ; Now this does not mean 'Where is there comfort from the gods?', the meaning supposed for Ag. 182 by Pope. Croesus thought that, after his many gifts to Apollo and after the (apparently) favourable oracle, he enjoyed the favour of the gods. When he found himself on the funeral pyre, he cried out in despair: 'Where now is the favour of the gods? Where is Apollo now?' This, then, is the natural meaning for δαϊμόνων ποῦ χάρις; in Ag. 182, if indeed it occurs there. But such a cry of despair, about loss of a favour which one previously believed one enjoyed, would be hopelessly out of place in Ag. 182.

There is also the word order. If the sentence is a question, why not ποῦ δὲ δαϊμόνων χάρις;? In all the examples quoted by Pope, ποῦ is first word, except in *Eum.* 422 (where there is an obvious reason why not). ποῦ δὲ is common enough, and so is δὲ ποῦ. Possibly putting δαϊμόνων first gives a different force to the sentence; but if so, the Bacchylides example would no longer be 'strikingly appropriate', or indeed appropriate at all.

The natural sense of χάρις in this passage is not 'comfort' but 'favour', or even 'generosity'. The immediately preceding lines talk, apparently, of good gifts from god to man: the gifts of φρονεῖν, μάθος, σωφρονεῖν. It is therefore natural to suppose, as many commentators have done, that χάρις should refer to the 'generosity' or 'favour' of the gods. It is all the more natural to do so, since in 180–1 Aeschylus says that the gift (if it be a gift) of σωφρονεῖν comes to man against his will (παρ' ἄκοντας), and this seems to tie up very closely with the idea of a favour that is *forced* upon men (which, if Turnebus is right, is very much the idea which is expressed in lines 182–3). It is therefore very much to Pope's point to prove that φρονεῖν, μάθος, σωφρονεῖν are not good gifts. In fact, if he cannot prove this, his defence of M's text has not a leg to stand on. It is not possible to say 'There is no χάρις of the gods' immediately after speaking of *good* gifts of god to man.

Pope therefore gives a very surprising new interpretation of φρονεῖν in this passage. He quotes *inter alia* A. Cho. 753:

τὸ μὴ φρονοῦν γὰρ ὡσπερεὶ βοτόν
τρέφειν ἀνάγκη . . .

S. Aj. 554–5:

ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν γὰρ μηδὲν ἥδιος βίος
ἔως τὸ χαίρειν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μάθης,

A. P. V. 443–4, 447–50:

νηπίους [sc. βροτοὺς] ὄντας τὸ πρὶν
ἐννοῦς ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους

He then asserts that φρονεῖν in Ag. 176 implies (or means, perhaps) to have 'consciousness' and 'something which we may call free will'.

Certainly in passages like the first two above φρονεῖν *does* imply no more than a rudimentary 'awareness'. Further, when Prometheus trained men in the P. V. he certainly made them φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους in something like this sense. But those passages are totally irrelevant to the present context. The present context concerns

not the kind of instruction which Prometheus gave to man; it concerns, instead, the tragic learning imposed on man by Zeus. A truly relevant parallel, involving precisely this kind of tragic learning process, occurs in the last lines of S. *Antigone*:

μεγάλοι δὲ λόγοι
μεγάλας πληγὰς τῶν ὑπεραύχων
ἀποτείσαντες
γῆρα τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδίδαξαν.

Man learns 'sense' after suffering tragic catastrophe. It is exactly the right kind of idea, although Sophocles makes more explicit the notion that the catastrophes follow upon impiety and hybris. Furthermore, Sophocles (in spite of *Aj.* 554–5) leaves us in no doubt about the value of τὸ φρονεῖν in this sense (*Ant.* 1347–8):

πολλῷ τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαμονίας
πρώτον ὑπάρχει.

That this is the meaning of φρονεῖν here is borne out absolutely by the parallel passages adduced by Pope for the word σωφρονεῖν. These are *Ag.* 1425, 1620, *P. V.* 982, *Eum.* 520. In all these cases, on Pope's own admission, the meaning is that sense is 'knocked into' some person or persons; the implication is clear, that in these passages σωφρονεῖν means 'to see sense', 'to be sensible'. It is clear that in *Ag.* 176–81 φρονεῖν and σωφρονεῖν are closely related in sense. Further, Pope admits that in *Suppl.* 176, 204, and *Sept.* 807 φρονεῖν means at least 'to be rational', which is near enough to the meaning 'to be sensible'; in the *Suppl.* passages it might well mean 'to be prudent'.

φρονεῖν then is the good gift of 'being sensible', with all the implications that this idea carries in Greek tragedy of a proper realization of man's limitations in face of the overwhelming power of the gods. Can the good gift become a bad gift because it is forced on man against his will, often in particularly painful circumstances? It would certainly seem to be two-edged: a most unpleasant gift for its unwilling recipient. Yet this two-edgedness is precisely what is recognized in Turnebus's text, χάρις βίαιος, and is not recognized in M's text, which uncompromisingly rejects the idea that there can be any χάρις at all. It would seem very difficult to attribute to Aeschylus a view that there was *no* advantage to be gained from τὸ φρονεῖν. This would set him at variance not only with Sophocles but with the whole set of ideas prevalent in Greek tragedy.

Now consider the run of the sense in lines 176–83. Lines 176–81 definitely imply a *good* gift from god to man, the gift of 'learning sense', 'being sensible'. It is a hard process of learning, which comes to man under duress. That is the gist of lines 176–81. It seems entirely reasonable and natural to carry on from there to say, in lines 182–3: 'The favour of the gods, seated on the awful throne, comes (I ween)³ to man perforce.' This is Turnebus's text. Nothing could sum up more succinctly, or with such a telling literary effect of paradox, the whole sense of the preceding lines. Enclitic *που*, the ironic 'I ween', is entirely appropriate; and notice also how βίαιος picks up the idea conveyed just before by *παρ' ἄκοντας*.

If M's reading is accepted, it is difficult to find any proper connection of thought between lines 176–81 and 182–3. I suppose that the basic sense would have to be: 'God knocks sense into man against his will. What comfort is there in gods who rule so violently?' But it is very difficult to find this sense in the Greek.

³ I apologize for the archaic English, but modern English 'I think' conveys the wrong impression.

Lines 176–81 certainly say that *σωφρονεῖν* comes against man's will and that the *μάθος* comes with *πάθος*. But 'knocks sense into' is a wrong emphasis. Again, as we have already seen, 'comfort' is not a plausible translation of *χάρις* in this context. There is also, in view of the Bacchylides parallel, great difficulty in translating 'δαιμόνων ποῦ χάρις;' to mean 'What comfort is there in gods?'⁴ Also, *δέ* seems uncomfortable and rather out of place. Besides these difficulties, *βιαιῶς* presents problems. Denniston–Page objected to the translation 'forcibly' (and indeed to taking *βιαιῶς* with *ἡμένων* at all) on the grounds that people 'cannot be seated forcibly'.⁵ Therefore Pope takes it to mean 'unnaturally' or 'by force'. Whatever could 'unnaturally' mean in this context? The gods are seated on their throne *παρὰ φύσιν*? Scarcely. Or *παρὰ δίκην*? Scarcely, in the *Agamemnon*. In any case, neither of these meanings gives the sequence of sense from lines 176–81 to 182–3 which is required above. It seems to me that the very clear implication of the word *βιαιῶς* (or *βίαιος*) is that something is being forced upon some person against his will, and this, coming directly after *παρ' ἄκοντας*, can refer only to the gift that is being forced upon man against his will.

It is interesting to note the two parallels adduced by Pope for *βιαιῶς*: *Cho.* 549 ('Clytemnestra will die *βιαιῶς*') and *Eum.* 555 ('The unjust man will lower his sails *βιαιῶς*'). In the first of these the word could imply 'violently'; in both it implies 'perforce', that is, against the will of the person concerned. If these are fair parallels, then we should have the gods ruling against their own will! That is not, perhaps, a fair criticism of Pope. But look how appropriate both these two examples are to Turnebus's text! In both cases, someone is learning a bitter lesson 'perforce'. This is *praevaricatio* on Pope's part; he is presenting evidence to the opponents of his thesis.

In a final effort to establish a contextual relevance for M's reading, Pope gives an analysis of the sense of the wider context. He outlines two possible trains of thought:

1. 'A was a terror. He was gruesomely deposed by B. Eventually B was in his turn disposed of by C. There can be no comfort in living under such a violent form of government.'
2. 'A was a terror. He was gruesomely deposed by B. Eventually B was in his turn disposed of by C. There is, I suppose, some comfort in living under such a violent system of government.'

Not unnaturally, Pope concludes that (1) is preferable to (2). But the analysis is false. To start with, he gives an account of the dynasty in which he stresses how gruesome and violent it all was; but that is not the stress given by Aeschylus. The stress is much more upon the overwhelming power of Zeus, who now finally reigns supreme after superseding such mighty predecessors. Next, he omits from his 'train of thought' the whole of lines 176–81, and since these lines are the immediate context of lines 182–3 and form an integral part of the train of thought, the omission is indefensible. The meaning of *χάρις* need not necessarily be 'comfort'; in fact, it is much more likely to be 'gift' or 'favour' in this context. Also, by Pope's own account, *βιαιῶς* does not mean 'violently', so that 'under such a violent system of government' is a misrepresentation. His interpretation of these two words is therefore tendentious.

⁴ 'Where is there any?' is 'ποῦ τις;' at P.V. 456. 'What joy is there?' is 'τίς χάρις;' at E. *Helen* 1402.

⁵ It may be worth noting that the seated

god of *Suppl.* 101 exerted no *βία* (*Suppl.* 99). Nevertheless I have no doubt that what he did to men came to them against their will and, in this sense, they suffered it *βιαιῶς*.

Thus Pope's interpretation and his defence of M's text are to be rejected, not because they offend against any theological canons of righteousness, but simply on grounds of language and context.

4. *Some views*

It will be clear by now that I support Turnebus so far as the text is concerned.

Pope notes that the Zeus passage occurs in the middle of the Iphigeneia story. He thinks that the only appropriate comment, in this situation, is 'There can be no comfort'. The idea of a *χάρις βίαιος* belongs, he thinks, to 'Aeschylus Theologus' rather than to 'Aeschylus Tragicus'. This seems to me a false view. The idea of a *χάρις βίαιος* is fully consistent (as we saw in the last section) with a tragic conception of Zeus. Indeed when Pope talks of 'Aeschylus Tragicus' he is vague as to what 'tragic' means, except that it is all very miserable and comfortless. My meaning for 'tragic' is specific. The Zeus who bestows upon man the enforced gift of bringing him to his senses against his will is the Zeus who sends those terrifying reversals of fortune which 'cast men down from their high-towering hopes' and 'scatter the proud in the imagination of their hearts'.

Further, the relevance of the Zeus passage to Iphigeneia is made explicit by Aeschylus himself in *Ag.* 218 ff., where Agamemnon's impiety (219–20) and loss of sensible restraint (221–3) are stressed. The doctrine of *πάθει μάθος* is explicitly applied in *Ag.* 250–1. Nothing here is inconsistent with the idea of *χάρις βίαιος*. In a way, Pope's interpretation of *τὸ φρονεῖν* is not altogether wide of the mark, since when Agamemnon in 218 ff. lost proper restraint he became somehow compulsively led on to disaster, scarcely knowing what he was doing as he rushed headlong into the impious act (lines 218–27):

ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκας ἔδν λέπαδνον
φρενὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν
ἀναγνον, ἀνίερν, τόθεν
τὸ παντότολμον φρονεῖν μετέγνω.
βροτοὺς θρασύνει γὰρ αἰσχρομήτης
τάλαινα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων.
ἔτλα δ' οὖν θυτῆρ γενέσθαι
θυγατρός, γυναικοποιῶν
πολέμων ἄρωγὰν
καὶ προτέλεια ναῶν.

He seems, thus, to have lost his 'awareness' when he lost *τὸ φρονεῖν* (*φρονεῖν* is of course used in a different sense again in line 221). *τὸ φρονεῖν* seems to imply 'keeping one's head and not being carried away'; in particular, not being carried away in the direction of overweening pride or of impiety. We can see from passages like this just what a boon *τὸ φρονεῖν* was felt to be; if only it could have saved Agamemnon in time, before all went so drastically wrong!

As for 'Aeschylus Theologus': Pope rightly rejects the notion that Zeus is a kindly, benevolent god. 'Mercy' is scarcely the point. Zeus is a stern god whose 'gift' to man is the harsh gift of bringing him to his senses against his will. Those scholars are surely right, who in recent times have insisted that there is here no comfortable doctrine of divine benevolence underlying the harsh blows of fate. Nevertheless, Pope's reaction has gone too far. He downgrades the gift of *φρονεῖν* to much too low a level. He fails to realize that, however dubious the gifts of *φρονεῖν*, *μάθος*, and *σωφρονεῖν* may be in the manner of their giving, it remains

true that the very words which Aeschylus uses (*φρονεῖν ὀδῶσαντα, τῷ πάθει μάθος θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν*) carry with them the seeds (if not more) of a new theological idea.

But what is this new theological idea? Is it any more than a statement of the old idea that 'even a fool sees sense after he has suffered for his folly?' In a way, it is. For it is not merely a theological affirmation; the idea is followed to the hilt within the actual drama and the tragedy. Many essential features of the drama (suspense, reversal of fortune, the unexpected element in the future, dramatic irony) are bound up with the nature of Zeus being what it is.⁶ It is a tremendous application of 'Call no man happy until he is dead'. It affirms that man must learn to fit in with his destiny and not to be proud and overweening; above all he must avoid impiety. True, the lesson comes too late for some; but *they* learn *τὸ φρονεῖν* even in the act of their suffering. Others, it may be hoped, will profit by the lesson in time.

These are but a few brief comments on a huge subject, which can scarcely be treated adequately in the present context; a full study of the *Prometheus*, in conjunction with all the other evidence, is needed. I would merely comment, at this stage:

- (1) I think that the reaction against the old theological interpretation has gone too far.
- (2) I think that the dramatic relevance of the theological aspect has not been taken sufficiently into account.
- (3) Not enough attention has been paid to the psychological implications of guilt and acceptance of the overwhelmingly powerful father-figure called 'Zeus'. Should not man be at times a little more on the side of the Titans?⁷

Department of Mathematics, Polytechnic of North London

N. B. BOOTH

⁶ N.B. Booth, 'Aeschylus *Suppl.* 86-95' *CP* 50 (1955), 21-5, particularly the concluding remarks.

⁷ As an addendum to all the foregoing, we may note a point in *Cho.* 59-65. In 59-65 the Chorus say that *τὸ εὐτυχεῖν* is 'a god and more than a god among men' (*ἐν βροτοῖς* certainly means 'among men', and not 'in the eyes of men', as it was wrongly interpreted by a number of commentators who did not wish to allow that Aeschylus could contemplate a world not ruled by

justice). They go on to say in 61-5 that justice tends not to get done unless there is some powerful living person present to see that it is done (according to the interpretation suggested in my articles in *CQ* 51 (1957), 143-5 and *CP* 54 (1959), 111-13). Yet there was dramatic irony about this: Orestes was already standing there in the background. This may help to confirm Pope's general view that the Chorus in Aeschylus does not always utter pious platitudes.